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 i 
QUESTION PRESENTED  
Whether the criminal prohibitions in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B(a)(1) on provision of “expert advice or 
assistance” “derived from scientific [or] technical … 
knowledge” and “personnel” are unconstitutional with 
respect to speech that furthers only lawful, nonviolent 
activities of proscribed organizations.   
 
 
 
 ii 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
 
The following parties were plaintiffs in the 
district court and appellees and cross-appellants in the 
court of appeals, and are respondents and conditional 
cross-petitioners in this Court:  Humanitarian Law 
Project; Ralph Fertig; Ilankai Thamil Sangam; Tamils 
of Northern California; Tamil Welfare and Human 
Rights Committee; Federation of Tamil Sangams of 
North America; World Tamil Coordinating Committee; 
and Nagalingam Jeyalingam. 
 
The following parties were defendants in the 
district court and appellants and cross-appellees in the 
court of appeals, and are petitioners and conditional 
cross-respondents in this Court: the Attorney General 
of the United States, Eric Holder, Jr.; the United 
States Department of Justice; the United States 
Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton; and the 
United States Department of State. 
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CONDITIONAL  
CROSS-PETITION FOR A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI 
 
  OPINIONS BELOW 
 
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-
32a)1 is reported at 552 F.3d 916.  Earlier opinions of 
the court of appeals are reported at 393 F.3d 902, 352 
F.3d 382, and 205 F.3d 1130.  The opinion of the 
district court (Pet. App. 33a- 76a) is reported at 380 F. 
Supp. 2d 1134.  Earlier opinions of the district court 
are reported at 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 9 F. Supp. 2d 
1176, and 9 F. Supp. 2d 1205.  
 
 JURISDICTION 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals was 
entered on December 10, 2007.  A petition for 
rehearing was denied on January 5, 2009.  Pet. App. 
3a.  On March 24, 2009, Justice Kennedy extended the 
time within which to file a petition for a writ of 
certiorari to and including May 5, 2009.  On April 22, 
2009, Justice Kennedy further extended the time to 
June 4, 2009.  The government’s petition for certiorari 
was filed and docketed on June 4, 2009.  The 
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 
1254(1) and Rule 12.5 of the Rules of the Supreme 
Court.    
 
                                                 
1 References to “Pet. App.” are to the Appendix to the government’s 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, No. 08-1498. 
  
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
 
The First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, in pertinent part:  “Congress 
shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble.”  The Fifth Amendment provides, in 
pertinent part:  “No person shall … be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  The 
relevant statutory provisions are reprinted at Pet. App. 
77a-81a. 
 
 STATEMENT 
 
This case involves the constitutionality of 
several provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, in particular 
those that criminalize speech and associational support 
that furthers the lawful, nonviolent activities of an 
organization that the government has designated as 
“terrorist.”  The government has petitioned the Court 
for review of a narrow, as-applied injunction affirmed 
by the court of appeals, which barred enforcement of 
three specific sub-provisions of the “material support” 
statute – those prohibiting the provision of “training,” 
“expert advice or assistance” “derived from … other 
specialized knowledge,” and “service” – as they applied 
to plaintiffs’ proposed pure speech. 
   
 Plaintiffs have opposed review on the ground 
that the court of appeals’ limited, as-applied decision 
creates no conflict among the circuits, leaves the 
material-support statute valid on its face, involves even 
the as-applied validity of only a few of the statute’s 
provisions, imposes no substantial limits on the 
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the government’s authority to prosecute support of 
terrorism, permits Congress to take further action, and 
is correct.  For all the reasons stated in plaintiffs’ Brief 
in Opposition in No. 08-1498, the Court should deny 
review. 
 
 If the Court grants the government’s petition, 
however, plaintiffs ask the Court to grant the present 
petition as well, to review the validity of two other 
interrelated sub-provisions of the statute – the bars on 
providing “expert advice or assistance” “derived from 
scientific [or] technical … knowledge” and “personnel.”  
18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A(b)(3), 2339B(h).  The court of 
appeals rejected plaintiffs’ challenges to those 
provisions.  But their validity raises questions closely 
related to those raised by the government’s petition. 
 
Plaintiffs rely on the Statement in their Brief  in 
Opposition for the factual and procedural background 
of this dispute, and add here only a brief discussion of 
the court of appeals’ treatment of the prohibitions on 
the provision of “expert advice or assistance” “derived 
from scientific [or] technical … knowledge” and 
“personnel.” 
 
Plaintiffs challenged these prohibitions on the 
same grounds that they advanced to challenge the 
prohibitions that the court of appeals invalidated as 
applied.  They argued that the provisions were vague 
and overbroad on their face and as applied, and that 
they punished speech and association in violation of 
the First and Fifth Amendments.2   
                                                 
2 As with the three sub-provisions that the court of appeals held 
invalid as applied, respondents seek to enjoin these two provisions 
only with respect to their proposed speech activities in support of 
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The district court determined that these 
prohibitions were not vague or overbroad, and did not 
otherwise violate the First or Fifth Amendments.  Pet. 
App. 66a n.23, 68a-70a.3  
 
 The court of appeals affirmed.  The court concluded 
that while the statute’s prohibition on expert advice 
“derived from … other specialized knowledge” was 
unconstitutionally vague, its prohibition on expert 
advice “derived from scientific [or] technical … 
knowledge” was “reasonably understandable to a 
person of ordinary intelligence.”  Id. at 24a.  The court 
offered no reasoning for this conclusion, and merely 
cited school reading lists that identified “technical” as a 
fifth-grade vocabulary word and “scientific method” as 
a third-grade vocabulary word.  Id.   
 
 While the court of appeals had twice previously 
declared the material-support statute’s prohibition on 
providing “personnel” unconstitutionally vague,4 see id. 
at 7a-8a (summarizing earlier rulings), it concluded 
                                                                                                    
the lawful, nonviolent activities of the PKK and the LTTE.  See 
Pet. App. 5a n.1; id. at 34a-36a.   
3
 The district court erroneously stated that respondents had not 
challenged the prohibition on providing “expert advice or 
assistance” “derived from scientific [or] technical ... knowledge.”  
Pet. App. 66a n.23.  In fact, respondents challenged the “expert 
advice or assistance” prohibition as a whole, and did not limit their 
challenge to advice derived from “specialized knowledge.”  See 
Complaint in 03-06107, ¶ 53; CA Excerpts of Record at 49.  
4 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno (HLP I), 205 F.3d 1130, 1137-
38 (9th Cir. 2000); Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded in 
light of intervening legislation by 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2004) (en 
banc).   
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that Congress had cured the infirmity by adding the 
following clause to the statute in 2004:   
 
No person may be prosecuted under this section 
in connection with the term “personnel” unless 
that person has knowingly provided, attempted to 
provide, or conspired to provide a foreign terrorist 
organization with 1 or more individuals (who may 
be or include himself) to work under that terrorist 
organization’s direction or control or to organize, 
manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the 
operation of that organization. Individuals who 
act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist 
organization to advance its goals or objectives 
shall not be considered to be working under the 
foreign terrorist organization’s direction and 
control. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h).  The court of appeals concluded 
that this definition “provides fair notice of prohibited 
conduct to a person of ordinary intelligence and no 
longer punishes protected speech.”  Pet. App. 26a-27a. 
 
 The court also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that these 
terms were substantially overbroad, that they imposed 
guilt by association in violation of the First and Fifth 
Amendments, and that they should be construed to 
require proof of intent to further the organization’s 
illegal activities.  Id. at 13a-19a, 27a-29a.5  
                                                 
5 The court of appeals rejected respondents’ First Amendment-
based right of association challenges to the statute in its en banc 
decision, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), but respondents 
preserved that challenge in all subsequent litigation in the event 
that further review were granted.  See Principal and Response CA 
Brief of Appellees at 4 n.3 (May 16, 2006).   
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 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
 
Plaintiffs have opposed the government’s 
petition for a writ of certiorari.  However, if the Court 
decides to grant review, plaintiffs request that the 
Court also grant review of the constitutional validity of 
two other inextricably interrelated prohibitions in the 
same statute, barring the provision of “expert advice or 
assistance” “derived from scientific [or] technical … 
knowledge” and “personnel.”  Both provisions have the 
same constitutional infirmities as those the court of 
appeals invalidated, and as applied to plaintiffs’ 
intended speech activities, they implicate the same 
constitutionally protected values.  Moreover, their 
interaction with the invalidated provisions exacerbates 
the vagueness of each provision, and thus fair 
consideration of the statute’s validity requires review of 
all the provisions plaintiffs specifically challenged.  
Accordingly, if the Court decides to review the validity 
of the three prohibitions the court of appeals 
invalidated, it should also review the two terms the 
court of appeals upheld. 
 
I.  The Provision Proscribing “Expert Advice or 
    Assistance” “Derived from Scientific or 
    Technical Knowledge” Is Unconstitutional 
 
The court of appeals correctly deemed the ban on 
advice “derived from … specialized knowledge” to be 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to plaintiffs’ 
speech, but erroneously concluded that the ban on 
advice “derived from scientific [or] technical … 
knowledge” was constitutional.  The court offered no 
reasoning for its conclusion that the latter aspect of the 
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expert advice ban was sufficiently clear, and simply 
cited two sources indicating that “technical” and  
“scientific method” are fifth-grade and third-grade level 
vocabulary words, respectively.  
 
This misconceives the duty of a court in 
assessing a vagueness challenge – of any sort, let alone 
under the First Amendment.  The question is whether 
the statute provides notice of what is prohibited – here, 
notice adequate to the context of a criminal prohibition 
where First Amendment interests are at stake.  Many 
words on grammar school vocabulary lists would not 
pass that test, or even lesser tests of vagueness.  See 
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (declaring 
vague even under due process guarantee, as well as a 
First Amendment violation, a city ordinance banning 
“annoying” behavior).6   Indeed, the word “specializes” – 
whose vagueness the court of appeals recognized (in 
the form, “specialized”) – is on one of the fourth grade 
lists from the same source the court cited.7  
  
From any relevant perspective, both “technical” 
and “scientific” are insufficiently clear where, as here, 
speech itself is criminalized.  In one common usage, 
what knowledge is “technical” depends entirely on 
what one’s assumed audience already knows or 
remembers or how much effort will be required to take 
it in.  (Is high school algebra “technical”? In what 
setting?)  Is speech about human rights, or lobbying, or 
                                                 
6
 Houghton Mifflin Reading Spelling and Vocabulary Word Lists 
(3rd Grade), www-kes.stjohns.k12.fl.us/wordlists/3rd/vocab3.htm 
(e.g., “monstrous,” “tremendous,” “awesome,” “incredible,” 
“intense,” “dreadful”).   
7
 www-kes.stjohns.k12.fl.us/wordlists/4th/vocab5.htm. 
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public relations derived from “technical” knowledge?  
How can any speaker reliably gauge the answer? 
 
Merriam-Webster’s on-line dictionary defines 
“technical” to include, inter alia: (1) “having special and 
usually practical knowledge especially of a mechanical 
or scientific subject,” (2) “marked by or characteristic of 
specialization,” (3) “of or relating to a particular 
subject,” and (4) “of or relating to technique.”8  This is 
at least as vague as “specialized knowledge,” the term 
the court of appeals found unconstitutionally vague; 
indeed, the second definition enumerated above is 
effectively identical to “specialized knowledge.”  And “of 
or relating to a particular subject” or “of or relating to a 
technique” may be even more expansive and 
ambiguous.   
 
“Scientific” also leaves vast room for uncertainty. 
 Merriam-Webster’s on-line dictionary defines 
“scientific” as “of or relating to science.”  It defines 
“science” as, inter alia: (1) “the state of knowing:  
knowledge as distinguished from ignorance or 
misunderstanding,” (2) “a department of systematized 
knowledge as an object of study;” or (3) “knowledge or a 
system of knowledge covering general truths or the 
operation of general laws especially as obtained and 
tested through scientific method.”9   Debates rage about 
when, or the extent to which, disciplines have become 
“scientific” (economics? psychology? linguistics? 
political science?).  Would training on how to present 
torture claims to a human rights tribunal be barred 
because assessing whether someone has been the 
                                                 
8 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/technical.   
9 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/science.   
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someone has been the victim of torture may in part 
involve “scientific” knowledge?   
 
Moreover, the statute requires individuals to 
determine not whether their speech is itself “technical” 
or “scientific,” but, even more ambiguously, whether its 
content in any way “derives from” scientific or technical 
knowledge.  Virtually all knowledge – from cooking to 
cleaning to nutrition to weather to law – can probably 
be said in some sense to derive from “scientific” or 
“technical” knowledge, rendering the distinction the 
provision draws not just unclear, but fundamentally 
incoherent.   
 
The government has noted that this definition is 
modeled on the definition of “expert testimony” under 
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  But as the 
district court held, Rule 702 serves as a general 
standard to be employed by trained judges and lawyers 
as a guide for trial practice, and “does not clarify the 
term … for the average person with no background in 
the law.”  Pet. App. 66a.   See Kuhmo Tire Co.  v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999); Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). 
 Courts generally deal with the notorious difficulty of 
assessing expertise by interpreting the term liberally 
and allowing cross-examination and the adversarial 
process to test the experts.  But such an open-ended 
approach is plainly insufficient to provide 
constitutionally adequate notice to ordinary citizens 
where criminal liability for speech and association is on 
the line.  
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The prohibition on advice derived from “scientific 
[or] technical … knowledge” also warrants review 
because its interaction with the provisions the court of 
appeals declared vague as applied to plaintiffs’ speech 
only exacerbates the vagueness of each.  If Judge 
Fertig, for example, were to offer legal instruction that 
permissibly consisted of general knowledge, could it 
nonetheless be barred if part of its content could be 
said to be derived from “technical” knowledge?  Is this 
permissible instruction because it is not “training,” or 
impermissible “expert advice?”  These overlapping and 
sometimes contradictory demands further complicate 
the already murky lines that individuals must navigate 
if they seek to avoid criminal liability. 
 
The “scientific or technical knowledge” 
prohibition also violates the First Amendment because 
it criminalizes speech – advice – on the basis of its 
content.  Individuals are free to provide advice to 
designated organizations if the advice is not “derived 
from scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge,” but face criminal sanctions if its content 
includes these proscribed subjects.  Content-based 
discrimination triggers strict scrutiny, and is 
permissible only where the government can establish 
that the distinction is the least restrictive means to 
further a compelling state interest.  Ashcroft v. ACLU, 
542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) (“content-based restrictions on 
speech [are] presumed invalid, and … the Government 
bear[s] the burden of showing their constitutionality”); 
Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 
115, 126 (1989) (“The Government may, however, 
regulate the content of constitutionally protected 
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it 
  
11 
interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to 
further the articulated interest.”).  The government has 
made no showing that singling out speech “derived 
from scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge” is necessary to further its interest in 
national security. 
 
Finally, the expert advice prohibition imposes 
guilt by association in violation of the First and Fifth 
Amendments.  Advice derived from scientific 
knowledge may be provided freely to the Palestine 
Liberation Organization or the Irish Republican Army, 
but the very same advice is a crime if provided to the 
PKK or the LTTE – even if the advice concerns only 
lawful, nonviolent activity, and the PKK and the LTTE 
use it only for such purposes. The trigger for the 
criminal penalty, then, is not the provision of advice, 
but the fact that it was provided to a particular group.  
Just as a statute prohibiting the provision of advice to 
the Communist Party but permitting the provision of 
advice to the Democratic Party would be penalizing 
association, so too this provision penalizes association.  
Invoking the First and Fifth Amendments, this Court 
has repeatedly insisted that any liability – civil or 
criminal – imposed on the basis of association must be 
limited to association intended to further the unlawful 
ends of the group.10    
                                                 
10  Congress specifically found that the Communist Party was a 
foreign-dominated group with the purpose of overthrowing the 
United States government, through means including terrorism.  
50 U.S.C. § 781 (West 1991) (repealed 1993), quoted in Aptheker v. 
Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 n.2 (1964).  Yet this Court 
consistently held that individuals could not be penalized for their 
Communist Party associations absent proof of “specific intent” to 
further the group’s illegal ends.  See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 
389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967) (government could not ban Communist 
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II.  The “Personnel” Provision Is  
      Unconstitutional 
  
The court of appeals also erred in upholding the 
amended “personnel” provision.  It concluded that in 
light of the 2004 definition limiting the “personnel” 
prohibition to action under the recipient organization’s 
“direction or control,” and exempting “entirely 
independent” activity, the provision is sufficiently clear 
to apprise individuals of the proscribed zone.  That 
definition, however, does not solve the constitutional 
problem with “personnel” for several reasons.  
 
First, it leaves the reach of the statute 
intolerably vague where, as here, core speech is at 
issue.  “Direction or control” could mean many things, 
and the exception for “entirely independent” activity 
can only leave a citizen worrying that “direction or 
control” might actually cover substantial sectors of a 
vast grey area between complete control and complete 
independence, consisting of myriad forms of 
coordination, collaboration, and communication.  An 
individual has to wonder: Why else would Congress 
have provided a safe harbor only for “entirely 
independent” activity?  An ordinary citizen cannot 
reliably tell whether the “personnel” provision 
                                                                                                    
Party members from working in defense facilities absent proof 
that they had specific intent to further the Party’s unlawful ends); 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606  (1967) (“[m]ere 
knowing membership without a specific intent to further the 
unlawful aims of an organization is not a constitutionally adequate 
basis” for barring employment in state university system to 
Communist Party members); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 
299-300 (1961) (applying same principle to criminal statute). 
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criminalizes or permits a host of contemplated 
activities within the class of plaintiffs’ proposed speech 
(see Pet. App. 5a n.1). 
 
For example, would running an op-ed or press 
statement by the PKK’s leader, or discussing its 
themes with him, constitute criminal acceptance of 
“direction,” or would that still be “entirely 
independent”?  What if the author accepted only three 
of the leader’s five suggestions?  Two?  One?  What if a 
plaintiff offered his legal services to work with the PKK 
or the LTTE in presenting a human rights petition to 
the UN?  One might think that a lawyer generally acts 
under the “direction” of her client, as, subject only to 
professional obligations, the client’s wishes are 
controlling.  But when this very issue arose in the 
prosecution of a lawyer under the “personnel” 
provision, the government opined that a lawyer acting 
as “house counsel” would be acting impermissibly 
under the organization’s “direction or control,” but an 
outside counsel doing the same work could be seen as 
“independent.”  United States v. Sattar,  272 F. Supp. 
2d 348, 359  (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  The court in Sattar 
concluded that such distinctions were altogether too 
evanescent to satisfy constitutional scrutiny, and 
declared the “personnel” ban unconstitutionally vague. 
 272 F. Supp. 2d at 359. 11 
 
Second, the “personnel” provision is vague with 
respect to associational rights.  It does not provide an 
                                                 
11 The Sattar case preceded the 2004 amendment to the 
“personnel” provision, but the government in that case maintained 
that the “personnel” provision was limited to action under a 
designated group’s “direction or control,” so it remains relevant to 
the amended statute’s meaning. 
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adequate distinction between membership in or 
affiliation with a designated group, which the 
government has said Congress permitted, HLP I, 205 
F.3d at 1134, and providing the group with “personnel,” 
which is a crime.  In the Sattar case, the government 
was unable to articulate any coherent or reliable 
distinction: 
 
 When asked at oral argument how to 
distinguish being a member of an organization 
from being a quasi-employee, the government 
initially responded “You know it when you see it.” 
... While such a standard was once an acceptable 
way for a Supreme Court Justice to identify 
obscenity, see Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 
197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring), it is an 
insufficient guide by which a person can predict 
the legality of that person’s conduct. See United 
States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 104 (2d Cir. 
2002) (“It is not enough to say that judges can 
intuit the scope of the prohibition if [the 
defendants] could not.”) 
 
Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 359-60.  The definition 
added to the statute in 2004 continues to leave unclear 
how one can be a member of or affiliated with a 
designated group without acting, in some respect, 
under its “direction or control.” Plaintiffs reasonably 
fear that any affiliation or collaboration may render 
them criminally liable.   
 
 Third, as with the expert advice provision, the 
interaction of the “personnel” prohibition with those 
the court of appeals held invalid as applied to plaintiffs’ 
proposed speech exacerbates the vagueness of each 
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of each provision. Entirely independent advocacy might 
be deemed “for the benefit” of a group, and training or 
legal advice on a subject of “general knowledge” might 
nonetheless be deemed to have been provided under a 
group’s direction.  Thus, if the Court is to review the 
three provisions the court of appeals invalidated, it 
should simultaneously review the “personnel” 
provision. 
 
Finally, as applied here, the proscription on 
acting under a designated organization’s “direction or 
control” impermissibly penalizes plaintiffs’ speech and 
association.  Penalizing speech because it is engaged in 
with another penalizes association, and violates the 
First and Fifth Amendments for the same reason that 
penalizing expert advice only when done in connection 
with particular groups violates the right of association. 
 Speech is often inextricably related to association; one 
usually speaks to or with or on behalf of others, 
especially when one engages in the sort of political 
speech that plaintiffs propose here, and to which the 
First Amendment extends its highest protection. 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-78 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
14-15, 25 (1976).  Advocacy is protected even when 
undertaken in collaboration with another, or under 
another’s direction.  The freedom of speech applies not 
only to Garry Wills, an independent author, but also to 
Bob Woodward, a Washington Post reporter.  Yet as 
applied here, the “personnel” ban impermissibly 
prohibits speech based on the identity of the political 
organization with which the speaker collaborates.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
For all of the above reasons, if the Court grants 
the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, it 
should also grant plaintiffs’ conditional cross-petition.  
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